On 28 May 1998, Pakistan became the world’s seventh nuclear power and the first nuclear weapons state in the Islamic world. The true father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon is not the self-publicist Dr A. Q. Khan but Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who took power in the aftermath of the Pakistani military collapse in the Bangladesh war in 1971. On two occasions – on 11 March 1965 and much later, when writing from prison – Bhutto referred to the lack of an ‘Islamic bomb’: ‘only the Islamic civilization was without it.’ But in the first case his remark was domestic rhetoric for the masses and propaganda to help ensure finance from Muslim-majority countries. In the second case, Bhutto was perhaps reflecting on the double standards of the existing nuclear states. Subsequently, in 1978, General Zia made a similar statement. ‘China, India, the USSR and Israel in the Middle East possess the atomic arm’, he declared. ‘No Muslim country has any. If Pakistanis had such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim World.’
When it came to authorizing the Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif confessed to the nation on 28 May that he had consulted the Holy Qur’an, and in particular Q.8:60, an injunction to ‘always to keep your horses ready’ which in the contemporary context could be taken to mean the latest technology of war: ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the heart of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies and others beside whom you do not know but Allah doth know, whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah shall be repaid unto you and ye shall not be treated unjustly.’ On the other hand, there are both Sunni and Shi’ite fatawa denouncing the use of nuclear weapons as contrary to Islam. Whether these arguments would withstand the challenge of a threat to the existence of the state concerned, such as an attack on Iran, is a matter of opinion.
Among
the reasons why there has been concern in the United States about the existence
of the ‘Islamic bomb’ has been firstly the fear of proliferation to other
states – which, contrary to the specific statement made by Nawaz Sharif in May
1998 (see Appendix 1 to this Introduction) occurred quite soon after the
Pakistani nuclear tests; and secondly, the fear of the appropriation of WMD by
terrorists. On the terrorist threat, Mowatt-Larssen writes: ‘By declaring it in 1998 to be his “Islamic duty” to acquire WMD, the
al-Qaeda leader envis[ag]ed the introduction of WMD (by either side) in the
atmosphere of all out war that was sure to follow 9/11; he pre-justified their
use on religious grounds. Finally, bin Laden made it a religious duty for his
followers to pursue WMD. Henceforth, Ayman [al-]Zawahiri made it his mission to
develop the religious case for using WMD, in parallel with his efforts to
acquire operational capability for future attacks against the US.’ The continuing fear of a
terrorist attack on its nuclear infrastructure is one reason why Pakistan is
scored as a state of high risk in the report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative
and Economist Intelligence Unit in January 2012 (see Appendix 2 below).
Attributes which are quasi-divine are conferred on nuclear weapons states and become a significant impediment to denuclearization. Uniquely – in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, especially the political disarray of Muslim majority states and the Sunni–Shia split – the ‘Islamic bomb’ is depicted as the supreme danger for Western civilization and the only nuclear weapon in the world’s arsenal which is perceived to have a religious identity. The irony is that the various commentators who have used the phrase ‘Islamic bomb’ have all meant something different by the term.
Campaigning against the threat of an ‘Islamic bomb’ began especially early in the United States, with the publication of Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney’s The Islamic Bomb: the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East in 1981. Weissman and Krosney were New York Times journalists. When a report hostile to Pakistan had appeared earlier in the New York Times in mid-August 1979, Qutbuddin Aziz, a Pakistani analyst, blamed it on a ‘Zionist conspiracy’. The United States’ fervent stance against the Pakistani nuclear program was interpreted as the handiwork of the Israeli lobby there. Aziz claimed that ‘international Zionist hostility’ was being implemented against Pakistan by the ‘pro-Jewish New York Times’ and the ‘Zionist-influenced CBS’. There was a definitive, anti-Zionist twist for the security and nuclear discourse of the Pakistani nation, which reinforced the ‘Islamic credentials’ of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Musharraf’s regime took a distinctly ‘non-denominational’ view of nuclear weapons, regarding them as essentially justified for reasons of national self-defence and nothing else and at the UN General Assembly on 15 September 2005 the President proposed a weapons restraint regime in areas of the world suffering tension, such as South Asia. Once the case of A. Q. Khan’s proliferation to states of concern became public in 2003, the Musharraf government sought also to deflect criticism of inactivity and to implement reforms. Confidential American cables obtained by Dawn through WikiLeaks reveal former Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri as seeking to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to have said, ‘We are the only Muslim country with such weapons and don’t want anyone else to get [them]’.
Writing in 2011 - before the US Navy SEALs’ attack on the hideout of Osama bin Laden on 2 May and the ISAF attack on 26 November on a Pakistan border post which resulted in 24 deaths, both of which events damaged US-Pakistan relations still further – the Obama administration’s Pakistan expert Bruce Riedel stated that
Pakistan
has been obliged to exercise the nuclear option due to [the] weaponization of
India’s nuclear programme. This had led to the collapse of the ‘existential
deterrence’ and had radically altered the strategic balance in our region.
Immediately after its nuclear tests, India had brazenly raised the demand that
‘Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the
region’ and threatened that ‘India will deal firmly and strongly with
Pakistan’. Our security, and peace and stability of the entire region was thus
gravely threatened. As a self-respecting nation we had no choice left to us.
Our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership’s reckless actions. After
due deliberation and a careful review of all options we took the decision
to restore the strategic balance. The nation would not have expected anything
less from its leadership.
Although Pakistan, ranking 31st overall, has
repeatedly stated that its nuclear arsenal [18] is secure, independently verifying that claim was difficult. Despite its
low overall ranking, Pakistan scores above the Index average in how well it
implements its international legal obligations, Pakistan does not score as well
as it could have because of a lack of publicly available information regarding
Security and Control Measures. Making appropriate details about relevant
security measures more public could be a feasible way to instil greater
international confidence. Pakistan is one of two states known to be continuing
to produce materials for nuclear-weapons purposes, and it is also the only
state out of those with weapons-usable nuclear materials that was scored as
having the presence of capable groups interested in illicitly acquiring
weapons-usable nuclear materials. [19]
Attributes which are quasi-divine are conferred on nuclear weapons states and become a significant impediment to denuclearization. Uniquely – in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, especially the political disarray of Muslim majority states and the Sunni–Shia split – the ‘Islamic bomb’ is depicted as the supreme danger for Western civilization and the only nuclear weapon in the world’s arsenal which is perceived to have a religious identity. The irony is that the various commentators who have used the phrase ‘Islamic bomb’ have all meant something different by the term.
Campaigning against the threat of an ‘Islamic bomb’ began especially early in the United States, with the publication of Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney’s The Islamic Bomb: the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East in 1981. Weissman and Krosney were New York Times journalists. When a report hostile to Pakistan had appeared earlier in the New York Times in mid-August 1979, Qutbuddin Aziz, a Pakistani analyst, blamed it on a ‘Zionist conspiracy’. The United States’ fervent stance against the Pakistani nuclear program was interpreted as the handiwork of the Israeli lobby there. Aziz claimed that ‘international Zionist hostility’ was being implemented against Pakistan by the ‘pro-Jewish New York Times’ and the ‘Zionist-influenced CBS’. There was a definitive, anti-Zionist twist for the security and nuclear discourse of the Pakistani nation, which reinforced the ‘Islamic credentials’ of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Musharraf’s regime took a distinctly ‘non-denominational’ view of nuclear weapons, regarding them as essentially justified for reasons of national self-defence and nothing else and at the UN General Assembly on 15 September 2005 the President proposed a weapons restraint regime in areas of the world suffering tension, such as South Asia. Once the case of A. Q. Khan’s proliferation to states of concern became public in 2003, the Musharraf government sought also to deflect criticism of inactivity and to implement reforms. Confidential American cables obtained by Dawn through WikiLeaks reveal former Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri as seeking to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to have said, ‘We are the only Muslim country with such weapons and don’t want anyone else to get [them]’.
Writing in 2011 - before the US Navy SEALs’ attack on the hideout of Osama bin Laden on 2 May and the ISAF attack on 26 November on a Pakistan border post which resulted in 24 deaths, both of which events damaged US-Pakistan relations still further – the Obama administration’s Pakistan expert Bruce Riedel stated that
the first objective of American policy toward Pakistan
must be to try to reverse its deep distrust of America, made all too clear in poll
after poll and outpourings of the Pakistani press. Sixty-three years of history
verify that America is an unreliable friend of Pakistan …
Pakistanis and Americans have entirely
different narratives about their bilateral relationship. Pakistan speaks of
America’s continual betrayal, of America promising much and delivering little.
America finds Pakistan duplicitous, saying one thing and doing another.
Americans want Pakistan to focus on the global threat, be it communism or
jihadism. Pakistanis want to concentrate on the threat next door, India …
Washington [Riedel continues] should try a
different approach, though it may be a long process: try to find the basis for
a civilian nuclear power deal. This would open the door to greater dialogue on
Pakistan’s past and to more transparency about where it is going. The process
itself would have value even if the odds of ever reaching a deal are slim.
If the United States does not do it, China
will. It is already committed to building two new nuclear power reactors in
Pakistan and wants to sign a China-Pakistan civilian power deal that balances
the US-India deal.
Given the continuous history of Chinese
support to Pakistan, and the highs and lows of the US-Pakistan relationship,
Riedel’s words must be treated as particularly pertinent.
Pakistan’s
recourse to nuclear deterrence against India has been reactive at every stage,
as Nawaz Sharif’s statement in May 1998 suggested. At most points, the nuclear
posture of the two countries has remained opposed. Table I presents J. N.
Dixit’s account of India’s non-proliferation policy in the 1990s, with the
Pakistani position defined beside it.
Table 1
India
|
Pakistan
|
1.
Willing to join any genuine effort at bringing about arrangements for
non-discriminatory non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.
|
1. Willing
to join any arrangements for non-discriminatory non-proliferation, arms
control and disarmament to which India is prepared to subscribe first.
|
2. Not
willing to join any discriminatory regimes, including the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty [opened for signature in 1996], regardless of assurances and
security guarantees the US and others were willing to offer.
|
2. Islamabad pledged in 1998 to sign the CTBT
if India did the same. It would not be the first to resume nuclear testing in
the sub-continent, but if India resumed tests, Pakistan would take action
appropriate to and consistent with its supreme national interest.
|
3.
Opposed to a South Asian nuclear weapons-free zone and to any conference
aimed at meeting this limited objective. [Sees China as a strategic threat,
see #4.]
|
3. Consistent advocate of a NWFZ for South Asia,
e.g. after the Indian PNE in 1974 and in 1991. Pakistan voted at the UN for a
NWFZ for South Asia every year between 1974 and 1997. The final document of
the 2000 NPT Review Conference supported the idea of the establishment of a
NWFZ in South Asia as well as the Middle East.
|
4.
Willing to participate in a broader Asian conference with a large number of
participants to discuss the possibilities of creating a nuclear-free zone in
the whole Asian landmass and its adjacent seas, provided that all countries
in the region, plus all the countries that have the nuclear weapons capacity
to affect the security environment of the region, undertake mutual and equal
obligations. [This would clearly include China.]
|
4. Pakistan would
probably leave this issue to be settled by China. In its November 1995 White
Paper on arms control and disarmament, China stated that it ‘has always
respected and supported the demands of the countries concerned for the
establishment of [NWFZs] on the basis of voluntary consultation and agreement
and in accordance with actual local circumstances ... China welcomes the
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty ... and supports the proposal by
relevant nations on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Korean
Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.’ The signing of a Central Asian NWFZ in 2006 makes the prospects of a broader
Asian conference remote. |
5. India
would participate in such a conference only if there was a formal a priori
assurance that the proposed enlarged Asian conference would be an interim
step towards holding a global conference on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament within a definite time limit.
|
5. Pakistan supports
the principle of a global conference on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. |
6.
Clearly indicated to all interlocutors that India would develop and deploy
missiles of various categories depending on its security requirements and that it
would not accept unilateral or admonitory stipulations and ‘disciplinary
measures’ from any quarter.
|
6. Viewed by Pakistan
as requiring a response, with the development and deployment of its own rival
missile systems. |
7. When
the US changed its position on nuclear testing, [the US and India] agreed to work together to finalize the CTBT provided it was
universal, really comprehensive and non-discriminatory. Regarding the US
proposal on observing fissile material restraint unilaterally or bilaterally,
with Pakistan, India was successful in moving the issue to the UN General
Assembly and then to the Conference on Disarmament, where it has remained
stalemated since 1994.
|
7. The CTBT remains
unsigned by Pakistan and India. Pakistan will not sign it first, before India
does so (‘The
CTBT without India would be meaningless for South Asia’). Pakistan rejects a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) on the grounds that
it has to proceed with fissile material production to address the conventional
military imbalance with India. Since 2005, Pakistan has cited the US--India
civil nuclear deal as the main reason for boycotting the FMCT, arguing that
Pakistan would cap fissile material production under the treaty, but India
could continue production in a civilian context and divert material for
weapons production against Pakistan if necessary. |
From
the preceding comments, it is clear why a book such as Rizwana Abbasi’s Pakistan
and the New Nuclear Taboo should find its place in a series devoted to the
history of religious and political pluralism. For as was argued in the
introduction to the companion volume, Warriors after War, the competing
strategic cultures of India and Pakistan arise from deeply entrenched views of
the ‘other’ in the military and political establishments of the two countries. Abbasi’s
account exemplifies both the ‘religious’ and the ‘political’ aspects of
pluralism. The pursuit of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent was designed to preserve
national independence – and therefore the idea of a Muslim-majority state as
envisaged at Partition in 1947 – against a threat emanating from India, which in
December 1971 presided over the ‘liberation’ of Bangladesh, formerly East
Pakistan. J. N. Dixit makes it clear that ‘there were both fundamental
strategic considerations and immediate political compulsions for India to
support the liberation struggle in Bangladesh’. There were fundamental strategic considerations and immediate political
compulsions for Bhutto to reply in kind to the Indian intervention by ordering
the rapid search for a nuclear deterrent to preserve Pakistan’s national
sovereignty and independence. In Dixit’s words, ‘Bhutto … was clear in his mind
that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the related delivery systems by
Pakistan was imperative if it was to match India’s superior conventional
technology and military capacities. This was the force multiplier that Pakistan
sought, and achieved.’
Rizwana
Abbasi analyses the ways in which Pakistan achieved its purpose through the
vagaries of regime change and differing international pressures, particularly
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was signed by three nuclear weapons
states (NWS: the US, USSR and UK) on 1 July 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
The account is novel in three respects. It works from the premise that regional
developments in South Asia cannot be viewed in a vacuum but need to be seen in
the context of global developments. A more effective non-proliferation regime
could potentially have halted the development of India’s nuclear weapons
programme and thus in turn Pakistan’s. Secondly, it uses the conceptual
framework of international relations theory, particularly regime theory, to
underpin the discussion of Indian and Pakistani developments at different
periods. One theory, such as realism, may be exemplified at a particular stage
of the development of Pakistan’s weapons; another, such as constructivism, at a
different stage. Thirdly, and potentially most important of all, the study
provides a critical commentary on theeffectiveness
of the various aspects of the non-proliferation regime and the extent to which
that weakness played into the hands of determined scientists such as A. Q. Khan,
who were bent on acquiring whatever Pakistan needed by any methods, legal or
otherwise.
Nina Tannenwald terms the tradition of non-use of nuclear
weapons since 1945 a powerful ‘taboo against the use of nuclear weapons’ which
has emerged in the global system over time. Rizwana Abbasi asks why a similar
taboo does not exist against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; why has one
not emerged and why is one not recognized? Such a ‘new nuclear taboo’ needs to
emerge and become accepted. Surprisingly to many commentators, Abbasi concludes
that Pakistan’s attempt to fall into line with the best world practice in
non-proliferation since the revelation of the A. Q. Khan scandal has had the
effect of championing this ‘new nuclear taboo’. It remains to be seen whether
it can be codified in practice at an international level and become fully
effective. The third taboo, against the possession of nuclear weapons by the
existing nuclear weapons states, seems as distant as ever.
Appendix 1
Text of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s statement
at a press conference on Pakistan’s nuclear tests: Islamabad, 29 May 1998 (APP)
Pakistan today successfully conducted five nuclear
tests. The results were as expected. There was no release of radioactivity. I
congratulate all Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians for their
dedicated teamwork and expertise in mastering complex and advanced
technologies. The entire nation takes justifiable pride in the accomplishments
of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Dr A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories
and all affiliated organizations. They have demonstrated Pakistan’s ability to
deter aggression.
For
the past three decades Pakistan repeatedly drew [the] attention of the
international community to India’s incremental steps on the nuclear and
ballistic ladder. Our warnings remained unheeded. Despite the continuing
deterioration in Pakistan’s security environment, we exercised utmost
restraint. We pursued in all earnest the goal of non-proliferation in South
Asia. Our initiatives to keep South Asia free of nuclear and ballistic weapon
systems were spurned. The international response to the Indian nuclear tests
did not factor [in] the security situation in our region. While asking us to
exercise restraint, powerful voices urged acceptance of the Indian
weaponization as a fait accompli. Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns were
not addressed, even after the threat of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear
blackmail. We could not have remained complacent about threats to our security.
We could not have ignored the magnitude of the threat. Under no circumstances
would the Pakistani nation compromise on matters pertaining to its life and
existence. Our decision to exercise the nuclear option has been taken in the
interest of national self-defence. These weapons are to deter aggression,
whether nuclear or conventional. Pakistan will continue to support the goals of
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Conference on
Disarmament, bearing in mind the new realities. We are undertaking a
re-evaluation of the applicability and relevance of the global
non-proliferation regimes to nuclearized South Asia. We are ready to engage in
a constructive dialogue with other countries, especially major powers, on ways
and means to promot[e] these goals, in the new circumstances.
Pakistan
has always acted with utmost restraint and responsibility. We will continue to
do so in the future. We are prepared to resume [the] Pakistan—India dialogue to
address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir,
as well as peace and security. These should include urgent steps for mutual
restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization. Pakistan has
already offered a non-aggression pact to India on the basis of a just
settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. I would like to reiterate this
offer.
We
have instituted effective command and control structures. We are fully
conscious of the need to handle these weapon systems with the highest sense of
responsibility. We have not, and will not, transfer sensitive technologies to
other states or entities. At the same time, Pakistan will oppose all unjust
embargoes aimed at preventing it from exercising its right to develop various
technologies for self-defence or peaceful purposes. I would like to again
assure all countries that our nuclear weapon systems are meant only for
self-defence and there should be no apprehension or concern in this regard. The
Pakistani people are united in their resolve to safeguard, at all costs,
Pakistan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. I would like to
congratulate the nation on the achievements of our scientists and engineers.
They have made it possible for the people of Pakistan to enter the next
century, with confidence in themselves and faith in their destiny.
Appendix
2
Excerpt
from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Report: NTI Nuclear Materials Security
Index. Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability and Action (January
2012)
India,
which ranks 28th overall, generally performs below the Index average across all
categories. The fact that it is one of two states known to be still producing
materials for nuclear-weapons purposes has an additional negative impact on
India’s score. Providing greater transparency into nuclear materials security
measures, establishing true independence for its nuclear regulator, and
improving regulations about the physical security of materials in transit are
all areas for urgent action.
[Note 18 in the Report.] The Index assesses weapons-usable
nuclear materials beyond those used in weapons or as counted as part of an
arsenal. Pakistani government statements about the security of the arsenal do
not necessarily address the nuclear materials security conditions for materials
that may be in bulk-processing facilities, in transit, or in storage.
[Note
19 in the Report.] This
indicator is hard to evaluate because of the challenges in collecting good data
about the intentions and capabilities of terrorist groups. Further research
into this area, particularly by international experts, is needed.
