Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo (General Editor's Introduction): forthcoming at Peter Lang, 2012

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On 28 May 1998, Pakistan became the world’s seventh nuclear power and the first nuclear weapons state in the Islamic world. The true father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon is not the self-publicist Dr A. Q. Khan but Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who took power in the aftermath of the Pakistani military collapse in the Bangladesh war in 1971. On two occasions – on 11 March 1965 and much later, when writing from prison – Bhutto referred to the lack of an ‘Islamic bomb’: ‘only the Islamic civilization was without it.’ But in the first case his remark was domestic rhetoric for the masses and propaganda to help ensure finance from Muslim-majority countries. In the second case, Bhutto was perhaps reflecting on the double standards of the existing nuclear states. Subsequently, in 1978, General Zia made a similar statement. ‘China, India, the USSR and Israel in the Middle East possess the atomic arm’, he declared. ‘No Muslim country has any. If Pakistanis had such a weapon, it would reinforce the power of the Muslim World.’


When it came to authorizing the Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif confessed to the nation on 28 May that he had consulted the Holy Qur’an, and in particular Q.8:60, an injunction to ‘always to keep your horses ready’ which in the contemporary context could be taken to mean the latest technology of war: ‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the heart of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies and others beside whom you do not know but Allah doth  know, whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah shall be repaid unto you and ye shall not be treated unjustly.’ On the other hand, there are both Sunni and Shi’ite fatawa denouncing the use of nuclear weapons as contrary to Islam. Whether these arguments would withstand the challenge of a threat to the existence of the state concerned, such as an attack on Iran, is a matter of opinion.

Among the reasons why there has been concern in the United States about the existence of the ‘Islamic bomb’ has been firstly the fear of proliferation to other states – which, contrary to the specific statement made by Nawaz Sharif in May 1998 (see Appendix 1 to this Introduction) occurred quite soon after the Pakistani nuclear tests; and secondly, the fear of the appropriation of WMD by terrorists. On the terrorist threat, Mowatt-Larssen writes: ‘By declaring it in 1998 to be his “Islamic duty” to acquire WMD, the al-Qaeda leader envis[ag]ed the introduction of WMD (by either side) in the atmosphere of all out war that was sure to follow 9/11; he pre-justified their use on religious grounds. Finally, bin Laden made it a religious duty for his followers to pursue WMD. Henceforth, Ayman [al-]Zawahiri made it his mission to develop the religious case for using WMD, in parallel with his efforts to acquire operational capability for future attacks against the US.’ The continuing fear of a terrorist attack on its nuclear infrastructure is one reason why Pakistan is scored as a state of high risk in the report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Economist Intelligence Unit in January 2012 (see Appendix 2 below).


Attributes which are quasi-divine are conferred on nuclear weapons states and become a significant impediment to denuclearization. Uniquely – in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, especially the political disarray of Muslim majority states and the Sunni–Shia split –  the ‘Islamic bomb’ is depicted as the supreme danger for Western civilization and the only nuclear weapon in the world’s arsenal which is perceived to have a religious identity. The irony is that the various commentators who have used the phrase ‘Islamic bomb’ have all meant something different by the term.


Campaigning against the threat of an ‘Islamic bomb’ began especially early in the United States, with the publication of Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney’s The Islamic Bomb: the Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East in 1981. Weissman and Krosney were New York Times journalists. When a report hostile to Pakistan had appeared earlier in the New York Times in mid-August 1979, Qutbuddin Aziz, a Pakistani analyst, blamed it on a ‘Zionist conspiracy’. The United States’ fervent stance against the Pakistani nuclear program was interpreted as the handiwork of the Israeli lobby there. Aziz claimed that ‘international Zionist hostility’ was being implemented against Pakistan by the ‘pro-Jewish New York Times’ and the ‘Zionist-influenced CBS’. There was a definitive, anti-Zionist twist for the security and nuclear discourse of the Pakistani nation, which reinforced the ‘Islamic credentials’ of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Musharraf’s regime took a distinctly ‘non-denominational’ view of nuclear weapons, regarding them as essentially justified for reasons of national self-defence and nothing else and at the UN General Assembly on 15 September 2005 the President proposed a weapons restraint regime in areas of the world suffering tension, such as  South Asia. Once the case of A. Q. Khan’s proliferation to states of concern became public in 2003, the Musharraf government sought also to deflect criticism of inactivity and to implement reforms. Confidential American cables obtained by Dawn through WikiLeaks reveal former Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri as seeking to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to have said, ‘We are the only Muslim country with such weapons and don’t want anyone else to get [them]’.


Writing in 2011 - before the US Navy SEALs’ attack on the hideout of Osama bin Laden on 2 May and the ISAF attack on 26 November on a Pakistan border post which resulted in 24 deaths, both of which events damaged US-Pakistan relations still further – the Obama administration’s Pakistan expert Bruce Riedel stated that

the first objective of American policy toward Pakistan must be to try to reverse its deep distrust of America, made all too clear in poll after poll and outpourings of the Pakistani press. Sixty-three years of history verify that America is an unreliable friend of Pakistan …

Pakistanis and Americans have entirely different narratives about their bilateral relationship. Pakistan speaks of America’s continual betrayal, of America promising much and delivering little. America finds Pakistan duplicitous, saying one thing and doing another. Americans want Pakistan to focus on the global threat, be it communism or jihadism. Pakistanis want to concentrate on the threat next door, India …

Washington [Riedel continues] should try a different approach, though it may be a long process: try to find the basis for a civilian nuclear power deal. This would open the door to greater dialogue on Pakistan’s past and to more transparency about where it is going. The process itself would have value even if the odds of ever reaching a deal are slim.

If the United States does not do it, China will. It is already committed to building two new nuclear power reactors in Pakistan and wants to sign a China-Pakistan civilian power deal that balances the US-India deal.

Given the continuous history of Chinese support to Pakistan, and the highs and lows of the US-Pakistan relationship, Riedel’s words must be treated as particularly pertinent.

Pakistan’s recourse to nuclear deterrence against India has been reactive at every stage, as Nawaz Sharif’s statement in May 1998 suggested. At most points, the nuclear posture of the two countries has remained opposed. Table I presents J. N. Dixit’s account of India’s non-proliferation policy in the 1990s, with the Pakistani position defined beside it.

Table 1

India	Pakistan
1. Willing to join any genuine effort at bringing about arrangements for non-discriminatory non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.	1. Willing to join any arrangements for non-discriminatory non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament to which India is prepared to subscribe first.
2. Not willing to join any discriminatory regimes, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [opened for signature in 1996], regardless of assurances and security guarantees the US and others were willing to offer.	2. Islamabad pledged in 1998 to sign the CTBT if India did the same. It would not be the first to resume nuclear testing in the sub-continent, but if India resumed tests, Pakistan would take action appropriate to and consistent with its supreme national interest.
3. Opposed to a South Asian nuclear weapons-free zone and to any conference aimed at meeting this limited objective. [Sees China as a strategic threat, see #4.]	3. Consistent advocate of a NWFZ for South Asia, e.g. after the Indian PNE in 1974 and in 1991. Pakistan voted at the UN for a NWFZ for South Asia every year between 1974 and 1997. The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference supported the idea of the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia as well as the Middle East.
4. Willing to participate in a broader Asian conference with a large number of participants to discuss the possibilities of creating a nuclear-free zone in the whole Asian landmass and its adjacent seas, provided that all countries in the region, plus all the countries that have the nuclear weapons capacity to affect the security environment of the region, undertake mutual and equal obligations. [This would clearly include China.]	4. Pakistan would probably leave this issue to be settled by China. In its November 1995 White Paper on arms control and disarmament, China stated that it ‘has always respected and supported the demands of the countries concerned for the establishment of [NWFZs] on the basis of voluntary consultation and agreement and in accordance with actual local circumstances ... China welcomes the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty ... and supports the proposal by relevant nations on the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.’ The signing of a Central Asian NWFZ in 2006 makes the prospects of a broader Asian conference remote.

5. India would participate in such a conference only if there was a formal a priori assurance that the proposed enlarged Asian conference would be an interim step towards holding a global conference on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament within a definite time limit.	5. Pakistan supports the principle of a global conference on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
6. Clearly indicated to all interlocutors that India would develop and deploy missiles of various categories depending on its security requirements and that it would not accept unilateral or admonitory stipulations and ‘disciplinary measures’ from any quarter.	6. Viewed by Pakistan as requiring a response, with the development and deployment of its own rival missile systems.
7. When the US changed its position on nuclear testing, [the US and India] agreed to work together to finalize the CTBT provided it was universal, really comprehensive and non-discriminatory. Regarding the US proposal on observing fissile material restraint unilaterally or bilaterally, with Pakistan, India was successful in moving the issue to the UN General Assembly and then to the Conference on Disarmament, where it has remained stalemated since 1994.	7. The CTBT remains unsigned by Pakistan and India. Pakistan will not sign it first, before India does so (‘The CTBT without India would be meaningless for South Asia’). Pakistan rejects a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) on the grounds that it has to proceed with fissile material production to address the conventional military imbalance with India. Since 2005, Pakistan has cited the US--India civil nuclear deal as the main reason for boycotting the FMCT, arguing that Pakistan would cap fissile material production under the treaty, but India could continue production in a civilian context and divert material for weapons production against Pakistan if necessary.

From the preceding comments, it is clear why a book such as Rizwana Abbasi’s Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo should find its place in a series devoted to the history of religious and political pluralism. For as was argued in the introduction to the companion volume, Warriors after War, the competing strategic cultures of India and Pakistan arise from deeply entrenched views of the ‘other’ in the military and political establishments of the two countries. Abbasi’s account exemplifies both the ‘religious’ and the ‘political’ aspects of pluralism. The pursuit of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent was designed to preserve national independence – and therefore the idea of a Muslim-majority state as envisaged at Partition in 1947 – against a threat emanating from India, which in December 1971 presided over the ‘liberation’ of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan. J. N. Dixit makes it clear that ‘there were both fundamental strategic considerations and immediate political compulsions for India to support the liberation struggle in Bangladesh’. There were fundamental strategic considerations and immediate political compulsions for Bhutto to reply in kind to the Indian intervention by ordering the rapid search for a nuclear deterrent to preserve Pakistan’s national sovereignty and independence. In Dixit’s words, ‘Bhutto … was clear in his mind that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the related delivery systems by Pakistan was imperative if it was to match India’s superior conventional technology and military capacities. This was the force multiplier that Pakistan sought, and achieved.’

Rizwana Abbasi analyses the ways in which Pakistan achieved its purpose through the vagaries of regime change and differing international pressures, particularly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was signed by three nuclear weapons states (NWS: the US, USSR and UK) on 1 July 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The account is novel in three respects. It works from the premise that regional developments in South Asia cannot be viewed in a vacuum but need to be seen in the context of global developments. A more effective non-proliferation regime could potentially have halted the development of India’s nuclear weapons programme and thus in turn Pakistan’s. Secondly, it uses the conceptual framework of international relations theory, particularly regime theory, to underpin the discussion of Indian and Pakistani developments at different periods. One theory, such as realism, may be exemplified at a particular stage of the development of Pakistan’s weapons; another, such as constructivism, at a different stage. Thirdly, and potentially most important of all, the study provides a critical commentary on theeffectiveness of the various aspects of the non-proliferation regime and the extent to which that weakness played into the hands of determined scientists such as A. Q. Khan, who were bent on acquiring whatever Pakistan needed by any methods, legal or otherwise.

Nina Tannenwald terms the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 a powerful ‘taboo against the use of nuclear weapons’ which has emerged in the global system over time. Rizwana Abbasi asks why a similar taboo does not exist against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; why has one not emerged and why is one not recognized? Such a ‘new nuclear taboo’ needs to emerge and become accepted. Surprisingly to many commentators, Abbasi concludes that Pakistan’s attempt to fall into line with the best world practice in non-proliferation since the revelation of the A. Q. Khan scandal has had the effect of championing this ‘new nuclear taboo’. It remains to be seen whether it can be codified in practice at an international level and become fully effective. The third taboo, against the possession of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear weapons states, seems as distant as ever.

Appendix 1

Text of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s statement at a press conference on Pakistan’s nuclear tests: Islamabad, 29 May 1998 (APP)

Pakistan today successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The results were as expected. There was no release of radioactivity. I congratulate all Pakistani scientists, engineers and technicians for their dedicated teamwork and expertise in mastering complex and advanced technologies. The entire nation takes justifiable pride in the accomplishments of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Dr A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories and all affiliated organizations. They have demonstrated Pakistan’s ability to deter aggression.

Pakistan has been obliged to exercise the nuclear option due to [the] weaponization of India’s nuclear programme. This had led to the collapse of the ‘existential deterrence’ and had radically altered the strategic balance in our region. Immediately after its nuclear tests, India had brazenly raised the demand that ‘Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region’ and threatened that ‘India will deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’. Our security, and peace and stability of the entire region was thus gravely threatened. As a self-respecting nation we had no choice left to us. Our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership’s reckless actions. After due deliberation and a careful review of all options we took the decision to restore the strategic balance. The nation would not have expected anything less from its leadership.

For the past three decades Pakistan repeatedly drew [the] attention of the international community to India’s incremental steps on the nuclear and ballistic ladder. Our warnings remained unheeded. Despite the continuing deterioration in Pakistan’s security environment, we exercised utmost restraint. We pursued in all earnest the goal of non-proliferation in South Asia. Our initiatives to keep South Asia free of nuclear and ballistic weapon systems were spurned. The international response to the Indian nuclear tests did not factor [in] the security situation in our region. While asking us to exercise restraint, powerful voices urged acceptance of the Indian weaponization as a fait accompli. Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns were not addressed, even after the threat of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail. We could not have remained complacent about threats to our security. We could not have ignored the magnitude of the threat. Under no circumstances would the Pakistani nation compromise on matters pertaining to its life and existence. Our decision to exercise the nuclear option has been taken in the interest of national self-defence. These weapons are to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional. Pakistan will continue to support the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the Conference on Disarmament, bearing in mind the new realities. We are undertaking a re-evaluation of the applicability and relevance of the global non-proliferation regimes to nuclearized South Asia. We are ready to engage in a constructive dialogue with other countries, especially major powers, on ways and means to promot[e] these goals, in the new circumstances.

Pakistan has always acted with utmost restraint and responsibility. We will continue to do so in the future. We are prepared to resume [the] Pakistan—India dialogue to address all outstanding issues including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as peace and security. These should include urgent steps for mutual restraint and equitable measures for nuclear stabilization. Pakistan has already offered a non-aggression pact to India on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. I would like to reiterate this offer.

We have instituted effective command and control structures. We are fully conscious of the need to handle these weapon systems with the highest sense of responsibility. We have not, and will not, transfer sensitive technologies to other states or entities. At the same time, Pakistan will oppose all unjust embargoes aimed at preventing it from exercising its right to develop various technologies for self-defence or peaceful purposes. I would like to again assure all countries that our nuclear weapon systems are meant only for self-defence and there should be no apprehension or concern in this regard. The Pakistani people are united in their resolve to safeguard, at all costs, Pakistan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. I would like to congratulate the nation on the achievements of our scientists and engineers. They have made it possible for the people of Pakistan to enter the next century, with confidence in themselves and faith in their destiny.

Appendix 2

Excerpt from the Nuclear Threat Initiative Report: NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index. Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability and Action (January 2012)

India, which ranks 28th overall, generally performs below the Index average across all categories. The fact that it is one of two states known to be still producing materials for nuclear-weapons purposes has an additional negative impact on India’s score. Providing greater transparency into nuclear materials security measures, establishing true independence for its nuclear regulator, and improving regulations about the physical security of materials in transit are all areas for urgent action.

Although Pakistan, ranking 31st overall, has repeatedly stated that its nuclear arsenal [18] is secure, independently verifying that claim was difficult. Despite its low overall ranking, Pakistan scores above the Index average in how well it implements its international legal obligations, Pakistan does not score as well as it could have because of a lack of publicly available information regarding Security and Control Measures. Making appropriate details about relevant security measures more public could be a feasible way to instil greater international confidence. Pakistan is one of two states known to be continuing to produce materials for nuclear-weapons purposes, and it is also the only state out of those with weapons-usable nuclear materials that was scored as having the presence of capable groups interested in illicitly acquiring weapons-usable nuclear materials. [19]

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[Note 18 in the Report.] The Index assesses weapons-usable nuclear materials beyond those used in weapons or as counted as part of an arsenal. Pakistani government statements about the security of the arsenal do not necessarily address the nuclear materials security conditions for materials that may be in bulk-processing facilities, in transit, or in storage.

[Note 19 in the Report.] This indicator is hard to evaluate because of the challenges in collecting good data about the intentions and capabilities of terrorist groups. Further research into this area, particularly by international experts, is needed.

The Al-Qaeda threat ten years after 9/11

The assassination of Osama Bin Laden was greeted by European leaders as something that would make the world safer. ‘Tell that to the fairies’ concludes Tariq Ali in his latest attack on the motives and policies of the United States (‘America’s selective vigilantism will make as many enemies as friends’, The Guardian, 6 September).

Before his death, Bin Laden and his operations chief, Abu Abd al-Rahman Atiyyat Allah, otherwise known as Atiyyah, swapped views about the composition of an attack team to mount an operation in the US coinciding with the anniversary of 9/11, with bin Laden repeatedly rejecting names that Attiyah suggested.

At the end of August, the US government confirmed the death of Atiyyah who may have been killed by a drone strike in Waziristan.His death was regarded as highly significant, perhaps even more so than the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s successor, were it to be brought about. Doubts about the claim have been expressed in Pakistan. This week has seen the arrest in Pakistan of Younis al-Mauretani, thought to be the jihadist name of Abd al-Rahman Ould Mohammed Hussein, an action for which the US has given appropriate credit to the ISI. This individual is important because of his links with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which might indicate a closer relationship between AQIM and the Al-Qaeda core than experts have previously thought.

All of which prompts the question, whither Al-Qaeda, ten years after 9/11?
Is there substance to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent claim that the United States is ‘within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda’?

If, as some have argued, Younis al-Mauretani acted as a quasi Al-Qaida ‘foreign minister’ what was he up to in the months preceding his arrest? ‘Mauritani was tasked personally by Osama bin Laden to focus on hitting targets of economic… importance in the United States of America, Europe and Australia’, a statement from the Pakistani military claims. ‘He was planning to target United States’ economic interests including gas and oil pipelines, power generating dams and [to] strike ships and oil tankers through explosive-laden speed boats in international waters.’ How far had such planning gone? Was there any realistic chance of such action being taken? Does Al-Qaeda still have the muscle to deliver a significant punch against the West - not a mortal blow such as on 9/11 - but a terrorist atrocity nonetheless?

Three observations are pertinent here. The first is that terrorist planning has clearly been disrupted by the assassination of bin Laden, the drone strikes on other leaders and the arrests that have taken place. Counter-terrorism has become more effective in recent years. This is hardly surprising, given ten years of warfare and the price countries in the West have paid in terms of curtailment of civil liberties. But the alleged ‘charisma deficit’ experienced by the loss of bin Laden as leader seems to be less important than the multiple challenges faced by his successors, including delayed decision-making caused by the need for greater caution – avoidance of electronic communication, more careful selection of couriers – a lack of ready funds and the potential drying up of recruits for the cause. None of these is necessarily a terminal problem, but the impatience of younger jihadists with the apparent inaction of the leadership could lead to factionalism which might weaken the movement. Alternatively, younger radicals might attempt a great strike themselves which, if it failed, could backfire on the terrorist credentials of the movement as a whole. To become just one of many terrorist groups, rather than the chief threat to the West, would be a serious setback to the movement.

A second observation is the lack of evidence, at least to date, that Al-Qaeda has gained access to weapons of mass destruction, especially materials for a ‘dirty bomb’. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s willingness to countenance the death of 10 million Americans in order to advance the jihadist cause has been well documented by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. Yet for all the fears about nuclear security in Pakistan, so far so good: the worst has not happened. Disaster has so far been avoided, Michael Krepon notes. More problematic is the pillaging of Qadaffi’s arsenal of heating-seeking missiles, the SA7s or 9M32Ms to use their former Eastern bloc designation. Since these could bring down a passenger aircraft they do pose the serious threat of a relatively easily mounted land-based attack should the weapons fall into the wrong hands. As yet, there is no knowledge of their whereabouts, which remains a serious danger. The main hope here is that the weapons have not yet been mated with the smaller type of launcher known as the grip stock. This configuration, which would make the weapon similar to the American-made Stinger, is considered a grave danger to civilian aircraft because the weapon is readily portable and relatively simple to conceal and use. Libya was not, apparently, supplied with grip stocks for its heat-seeking missiles.

Finally, there is need to consider the continued ideological threat posed by Al-Qaeda. The consensus at present seems to be that if the revolutions resulting from the ’Arab Spring’ are successful, Al-Qaeda will be consigned to irrelevance. But given the potential divisions in Libya, Egypt and elsewhere, and the lack of progress by the rebels in Syria, success cannot be guaranteed. The question to be tested in all these countries, as also in Afghanistan, is whether the Islamists are more committed to democracy than they are to a hardline interpretation of the Sharia. Ayman al-Zawahiri has already criticized them for this: ‘We demand ... the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority. Its ummah chooses its rulers... If they deviate, the ummah brings them to account and removes them.’ Similarly, he writes: ‘Any government established on the basis of a constitution that is secular, atheist, or contradictory to Islam cannot be a respected government because it is un-Islamic and not according to sharia.’ This is what Al-Zawahiri means when he writes: ‘the Muslim movement in general, and the jihadi movement in particular, should wage the battle of intellectual argument just as much as the battle of weapons.’

It cannot be assumed that the intellectual argument has been lost by Al-Qaeda, particularly in the Pashtun homelands in southern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan where commitment to a highly conservative view of sharia is widespread. Of great importance here is the inability of the present Afghan government and its Western advisers to recruit southern Pashtuns into the national Afghan army in any significant numbers. This reflects a deep and lingering fear of the insurgents, or sympathy for them, as well as doubts about the stability and integrity of the central government in Kabul. The New York Times reports that the predominantly Pashtun southern and south-eastern provinces — Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Zabul, Paktika and Ghazni — make up about 17 percent of Afghanistan’s total population, yet they have contributed just 1.5 percent of the soldiers recruited since 2009. While the overall representation of Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, in the army is equitable — they make up about 42 percent of the population and roughly the same percentage of the army — the vast majority come from a few north-eastern provinces. The absence of southern Pashtuns reinforces the impression that the army is largely a northern institution — to be used against the southern provinces — in what is a potentially dangerous division of the country. This is potentially fertile territory for the ideological warfare which is likely to be conducted by Al-Qaeda under Ayman al-Zawahiri. Key factors to watch are the apparent strengthening of the Haqqani network at the expense of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), its ongoing links with Al-Qaeda and the continued commitment of the Haqqani network to fight against the US forces in Afghanistan as their principal enemy: it is by forging and maintaining such alliances that Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda could overcome recent setbacks and emerge as a continuing threat.

Reflections on the tenth anniversary of 9/11

Overall – how would you describe the events of 9/11?
The coordinated attack using passenger aircraft as lethal weapons of destruction was an unprecedented crime against humanity which traumatized the United States and also the western world and the population of most Muslim-majority countries. It was deliberately precipitated by Usama bin Ladin and his co-conspirators in an attempt to precipitate a clash between the West and the Islamic world (‘clash of civilizations’) that would be favourable to al-Qaeda’s ambitions. The Western intervention in Afghanistan adopted the wrong strategy at the outset but was an understandable reaction: no President of the United States could have left the attack unanswered. What is regrettable is that President George W. Bush and his principal advisers - notably Vice-President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld – were excessively preoccupied with using the 9/11 attacks as a justification for what came to be termed ‘regime change’ against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In reality, Saddam had no links with al-Qaeda and the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts were unrelated. This meant that in the long term the war in Iraq diverted vital resources in manpower and money away from Afghanistan and ensured that the war in Afghanistan would become a long and apparently unwinnable struggle.

How has it changed Afghanistan?
Had the Taliban government been prepared to surrender the al-Qaeda leadership in 2001 (and the Kandahar shura was divided on the issue and came close to doing so) an enormous amount of destruction and loss of life would have been prevented. There would still have been a problem for the West in knowing how to deal with the Taliban regime, which had close to pariah state status and was only recognized by three states (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). But it would at least have been able to separate out the distinctive issues of the pursuit of al-Qaeda – which had perpetrated the atrocities of 9/11 – and the Taliban, who had given them sanctuary but not attacked targets in the West. Targetting both al-Qaeda and the Taliban simultaneously meant that the West made the crucial error of siding with the minority Northern Alliance and thereafter alienating the Pashtun majority. These early errors were compounded by having insufficient western troops on the ground and backing a corrupt and ineffective government headed by Hamid Karzai, who was called by bin Ladin ‘the mayor of Kabul’, thereby implying that he was a western stooge.

Pakistan?
Here the effect has been huge. Before 9/11 Pakistan had almost no problem with domestic terrorism. It was a fairly safe country for the westerner to move around in and there seemed reasonable hope that it could develop rapidly both economically and politically. The effect of the war in Afghanistan has been to create a significant insurgency within Pakistan itself, which is largely Pashtun-based and has some links to the Pashtun-based Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Immediately after 9/11, the US forced the Musharraf regime to reverse its foreign policy with regard to Afghanistan; but this has been unsustainable in the longer term. Once the US declared its wish to reduce its military commitment in Afghanistan drastically by 2014, Pakistan has increasingly had to plan for a future when it is once more on its own in dealing with its regional neighbours. And – hugely significant, but largely unreported in the West – President Obama’s escalation of Bush’s policy of drone attacks has done enormous harm to the US-Pakistan relationship. This has policy has become an ‘own goal’ for the US in the war on terror. On this, see the detailed arguments elsewhere in my blog.

Iraq?
Iraq’s infrastructure was seriously damaged by the allied invasion in 2003. This was an indirect consequence of 9/11, because George W. Bush was mistakenly convinced that Saddam Hussein ‘had to have been’ involved in those events. Another consequence has been the heightened sectarianism in Iraq and the involvement of Iran in its internal affairs. It remains to be seen whether a unified and stable Iraq can emerge from the mess of the war: once the tensions between Shia and Sunni have come out into the open, they are very difficult to remedy within a unified state.

The Middle East?
There have been significant al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda linked threats to Saudi Arabia (which were overcome), Yemen and Somalia (which have not been resolved). The political upheaval in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria is completely unrelated to al-Qaeda, however, which demonstrates how little impact – perhaps surprisingly – the events of 9/11 have had on the Middle East, which is proceeding at its own pace of development on internal issues.

Is the world safer since 9/11?
To the extent that there is a greater awareness of the threat from transnational terrorist groups, and cooperation between intelligence services, yes. But in the larger sense no, because by the very nature of terrorism – its random attacks on people unconnected with the conflict that motivates the attacker – soft targets are chosen and the timing is random and unpredictable. It is very difficult for governments, particularly in democratic countries with respect for civil liberties, to defend large urban populations at all times against every eventuality. It is therefore probable that terrorism will continue to be a significant problem, with the greatest danger posed by individuals and small groups who have little or no track record in previous acts of terrorism and are therefore not perceived as a threat by the security services: the recent atrocity committed in Norway by Anders Behring Breivik is a case in point.

Did the Bush administration overreact?
Yes, and predictably so. The issue was not so much that the United States would react militarily – this was inevitable since 9/11 was seen as a worse attack than Pearl Harbor in 1941 – but the ideological aspects of the response and the dysfunctional and chaotic organization of the war effort were hugely negative factors. On all this, my book False Prophets: the ‘clash of civilizations’ and the global war on terror (2008) highlights the issues. Most important of all, because the US was determined to intervene in Iraq, it took its eye off developments in Afghanistan, which was seriously under resourced in numbers of troops: this allowed the Taliban to regroup and bid for power once more.

Did US actions result in an anti-US coalition?/ increased anti-US sentiment?
There is strong opinion poll evidence that it did create anti-US sentiment in both the Middle East and Pakistan. This has not led to the formation of an anti-US coalition both because the US is too powerful and because of the differing interests of states in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia, for example, is more preoccupied with the threat from Iran than any threat from the US. Al-Qaeda sought to exploit the Israel—Palestinian conflict for its own purposes but this has been largely unsuccessful.

In British terms, what were the effects of 9/11 – and of the subsequent 7/7 attacks on the Tube and the bus in London?
People at first could not quite imagine that any British-born Muslims would come out and side so openly with bin Ladin and the international jihadists as did the 7/7 terrorists. This has led to a great deal of soul searching and some degree of muddled response. The Muslim communities in the UK have been under pressure to police their own young people and Britain’s long and – on the whole respectable – treatment of religious and ethnic minorities has been criticized at home and abroad. Yet a modern multicultural and multi-faith society with liberal values has to operate more or less in the open way that Britain has done. We need to take care not to throw out the good in a drive towards making our society safer from home-grown terrorism. It’s a difficult balance to strike and the development of appropriate policies is not helped by the fact that it has become a party political issue.

Have the wounds of 9/11 healed?
Certainly not in the US, Afghanistan or Pakistan. Perhaps more so in Britain, but there will be significant political fallout when the commission of enquiry on Britain’s intervention in Iraq, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, finally reports. This is likely to demonstrate how slavishly Tony Blair followed the line of George W. Bush, and question whether the intervention in Iraq was either legal under international law or justified by the threat which Saddam Hussein was said to pose to international security and the security of Britain. This is all only an indirect consequence of 9/11, but we need to remember that in the aftermath of these events George W. Bush was determined to ‘prove’ that in some way Saddam’s hand was behind the attacks on the US and that his regime posed a greater threat even than bin Ladin and al-Qaeda. Whatever one may think of Obama’s policy, his concentration on bin Ladin and al-Qaeda is a corrective to the Bush strategy.

Where were you on 9/11?
I was in a hotel room in Pakistan and watched the events live on TV. I watched with horror – as so many around the world did – knowing that the world would never be quite the same again, but praying in confidence that the insane objectives of al-Qaeda would not be supported by the Muslim world. The unequivocal condemnation of terrorism by Muslim-majority states was a notable feature of the weeks and months after 9/11: in that sense, Bush and Blair had a huge amount of international support which they managed to dissipate through their mistaken policies.

And your reaction then as you watched the towers fall?
A military response from the US was inevitable, but in an address made at a Christian church in Rawalpindi I made the distinction between the sort of response which I felt was likely – what I considered would be an overreaction and would make everything worse – and a somewhat slower, better conceived and internationally coordinated response which would reap better long-term dividends for the cause of international peace. I still believe that George W. Bush and his advisers – especially Cheney, Condoleeza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld – largely played into the hands of Usama bin Ladin and reacted in the way he hoped they would. Fortunately for the world, bin Ladin was unable to bring about the anti-US or anti-West coalition he had hoped the events of 9/11, and the US response to those events, would achieve.

Ownership-building measures for Kashmir

‘The idea of progressing from CBMs (confidence-building measures) to OBMs (ownership-building measures) is to revert the problem-solving ambit back into the hands of the primary stakeholders, viz. the 20 million or so people living across the breadth of the divided State.’ Thus wrote Tanveer Ahmed on 19 April this year in The Rising Kashmir.

The literature on OBMs, ownership-building measures, is as yet in its infancy. In order to consider further the question of ownership, the author had to consult some of the literature on measuring performance in capacity building interventions. Ownership, Gene Ogiogio writes, ‘can be described as the extent to which a country, an organization or a group of stakeholders has unrestricted influence or control over a resource, an activity, process or an output. Unless a capacity-building process is owned by its stakeholders, it is not likely to be sustainable. Ownership and sustainability are therefore two sides of the same coin.’ Ownership in capacity building interventions centres around three main issues: 1) Ownership of the financial resources with which capacity is built. 2) Ownership of the capacity (human skills and institutions) that generate policies and programs for development. 3) Ownership of the policies and programs that result from the skills and institutions used (capacity). In measuring the level of local ownership in capacity building, it is desirable to take all components of the ownership factor into consideration. ‘In summary’, Ogogio writes, ‘ownership in capacity building measures ownership of the financial resources through which interventions are made, ownership of the skills and institutions resulting from the interventions, and ownership of the policies and programs that result from the capacity building interventions. If skills, institutions, policies and programs are not owned locally after interventions in capacity building, then such intervention is still far from successful.’

The first and fundamental innovation in moving from a CBM-based to an OBM-based future for Kashmir is to develop a mechanism whereby the genesis, planning and implementation of future measures for peace rests with the people of the divided Kashmir. Not only do they need to understand and own the confidence-building measures for their future sustainability; they need to plan and own that which is likely to be of greatest benefit to themselves. Others can, and do, imagine these things for them. This contribution imagines these things on behalf of those who at present have no voice. But the important thing for the future is to imagine in what way the people themselves might have a voice and a say in which ownership-building measures will bring about the greatest benefit to themselves in the shortest possible timeframe.

At the outset, such a future seems to have little likelihood of being achievable because of the close attention of the two proximate states with the greatest interest in the security and sovereignty aspects of Kashmir’s future. Here, however, it is possible to argue that India and Pakistan have every reason to concentrate on the issues of security and sovereignty and favour a detailed solution to the Kashmir problem that delegates as much of the non-security related responsibilities as possible to the local level – at the very least, this serves to divert the focus away from the intractable international politics of peace-making with the high stakes on failure or success.

The former Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir has suggested among his twelve CBMs the setting up of a Joint Pakistan-India-Kashmir Development Fund. This is indeed desirable, but requires a prior measure in order to secure the effectiveness of this development fund or any aid received from abroad. Development funding should be conditional on the nature of the NGOs or other local stakeholders planning the CBMs or carrying out the identified tasks within Kashmir. The highest priority, it is suggested here, is to identify the local NGOs or stakeholders who alone can propose ownership-building measures which will bring about the greatest benefit to all Kashmiris in the shortest possible timeframe. Caution is needed and attention needs to be paid to the Bosnian example. There, as Roberto Belloni argues, ‘instead of providing incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation, foreign monies and market-oriented reforms gave further opportunities to ethnic elites to enrich themselves...’ Even the strategy of direct funding of NGOs had little success. Bosnian NGOs ended up depending too much on foreign funding and therefore tended to reflect the priorities of their funders rather than articulating and addressing the views of local communities. Sectarian organizations, Belloni writes, ‘perpetuate the divisions within society and can contribute to political polarization and continuing confrontation between groups. Although these divisions complicate the tasks of international agencies, they do not make it impossible, but it requires a judicious assessment of the local reality and careful support to those groups which strive to promote civic politics instead of ethnic politics, and social and political spaces of dialogue instead of ethnic or national segregation.’

The US Ambassador to India placed the ‘strengthen[ing of] civil society by making it easier for NGOs to operate’ last in his list of 20 CBMs in 2009. With the amendment to ‘the strengthening of civil society by making it easier for NGOs to operate across the LoC’ it is suggested that this should be the first and most important CBM – because it is the only one which will lead predictably to an OBM-based future for Kashmir, whereby the genesis, planning and implementation of future measures for peace rests with the people of the divided Kashmir. The priority is to strengthen civil society in the two parts of divided Kashmir by empowering NGOs which are genuinely pluralistic bodies in all senses of the term – in their political origins, and in their ethnic, religious and linguistic composition. They may not exist at present, or only in embryonic form. The task of international stakeholders is to bring them about.

At a conference in April this year, the OSCE affirmed:
Non-military confidence-building measures (CBMs), employed alone or alongside other rehabilitation and reconciliation instruments, can be effective tools to reduce tensions, guard against a relapse to further conflict/crisis and build trust between the sides to the conflict/crisis, including as part of stabilization and peace-building efforts. However, their success and sustainability depend on the genuine will of the sides to employ them. Local ownership is essential. Nevertheless, the international community has an important supporting role: to convince the sides of the utility of CBMs, to assist in the development and implementation of balanced and effective CBMs; and, to act as a third party if/when/where appropriate.

It is proposed that non-military CBMs/OBMs should be evaluated for their feasibility and the processes whereby they might be implemented. A good model for such work is the briefing on trade across the LoC published by Conciliation Resources in partnership with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi) and the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Reform and Transparency (Islamabad): the briefing, entitled Intra Kashmir Trade, was published in January 2011.

DRONE WARS IN PAKISTAN: WHEN THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE WAR ON TERROR BECOMES AN ‘OWN GOAL’

‘We want to make you strong, so that you can make a strong Pakistan as a strong Pakistan is in our interest.’ The words of US Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, were made in the context of the repair of schools in Fata and Malakand under USAID assistance. The effort is important: Pakistan Taliban and other militant attacks should never have been directed at the educational system in the first place, least of all in the underdeveloped areas of Khyber Paktunkhwa.

Yet American policy in Pakistan has been curiously dysfunctional and especially since 2004 has followed contradictory aims. For since that year, the US has launched almost 250 drone attacks aimed at targets within Pakistan, almost all of which have been launched from Pakistan itself. Pakistani sources contend that more than 2,500 people have been killed, mostly civilians. This is denied by the US government, by sources within the CIA and even by reputable scholars in the US, who contend that the drones are – uniquely in the history of warfare – completely accurate in their targeting and kill only the ‘bad guys’. Drones remove the ‘high value’ targets who it would be difficult otherwise to neutralize. Or so it is claimed. But is it true? There are campaigners in NGOs in the West such as Clive Stafford Smith of the group Reprieve who argue the Pakistani case that these weapons are much less accurate than is argued by the apologists of the US government.

The fury with which Pakistanis regard the ‘collateral damage’ caused by the drone attacks, especially the killing of children, would be difficult to comprehend if the cases of civilian casualties were not true. Not only are they true, they have been photographed and the photographs have been exhibited publicly. The fact is, that contrary to international law, the US keeps no records of civilian casualties of its drone attacks. It is in denial because this failure to keep records of casualties is a clear violation of international law. A recent report for the Oxford Research Group argues that while ‘the situation in Pakistan is somewhat ... difficult given the governmental protests against drone attacks‘, if the drone attacks are not consensual ‘then it is the United States that must shoulder the international responsibility. However, in the likely event that Pakistan is equally and severally responsible for all of the obligations set out above. Furthermore, Pakistan may have to compensate those families for [its] complicity in these violations.‘

John A. Rizzo, who served as the CIA‘s top lawyer during the Bush administration, said he found it odd that while Bush-era interrogation methods like waterboarding came under sharp scrutiny, ‘all the while, of course, there were lethal operations going on, and ... there was never, as far as I could discern, ... any debate, discussion, questioning ... [that] the United States [was] targeting and killing terrorists.‘ The hub of activity for the targeted killings is the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, where lawyers — there are roughly 10 of them, says Rizzo — write a cable asserting that an individual poses a grave threat to the United States. The cables that were ‘ready for prime time‘, as Rizzo puts it, conclude with the following words: ‘Therefore we request approval for targeting for lethal operation.‘ There was a space provided for the signature of the general counsel, along with the word ‘concurred‘. Rizzo says he saw about one cable each month, and at any given time there were roughly 30 individuals who were targeted. It is Rizzo who is the subject of attempted legal action being pursued in the West on behalf of the relatives of victims of two specific drone attacks in September and December 2009 which are being used as a test case.

Even two American writers who extol the advantages of using drones concede that ‘military operations inside Pakistan do pose international legal problems ... because the United States is technically not at war with Pakistan and because US drone operations in Pakistan are being conducted by the CIA rather than the armed forces. The former violates the UN Charter; the latter arguably violates the rules on lawful combat in the Geneva Conventions. These dynamics create legal problems for US military operations in Pakistan whether they are carried out by drones or by SEAL teams on the ground, as in the Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden.‘ On the detailed arguments, the briefing report for the Oxford Research clarifies the issues at stake.

All of which makes the aftermath of the visit of the head of Pakistan's chief intelligence service, the ISI, to the United States on 13 July with his request that drone attacks should either be halted or significantly scaled down because of its negative impact on Pakistani public opinion extremely important. A mystery surrounds conflicting views as to whether the request went further, for CIA operatives and all US personnel to abandon the Shamsi airbase in Balochistan, the base of operations for the drone strikes. ‘As frustrating as this relationship can sometimes be, Pakistan has been absolutely critical to many of our most significant successes against al Qaida‘, John Brennan, President Barack Obama‘s top counterterrorism adviser, stated on 27 July. ‘I am confident that Pakistan will remain one of our most important counterterrorism partners.‘ The same day, Pakistani Defence Minister Ahmed Mukhtar was quoted as saying that Pakistan had ended CIA drone flights from Shamsi airfield in Balochistan. Dawn, the principal English language daily in Pakistan, commented on 2 August: ‘if the mystery surrounding Shamsi air base is deep, the one surrounding the exact nature and state of the overall relationship between the US and Pakistan is even deeper. A report in this newspaper yesterday suggested that Pakistan has succumbed to US pressure after American officials warned that curtailing the US presence in Pakistan would lead to a slowdown in the disbursement of aid and technical assistance to the military.‘

Most commentators are likely to suspect that Pakistan has reverted to its traditional posture - for which it has been denounced in the past by US senators and others - of showing public disapproval for US policy towards the country, in order to hold public opinion in line, while secretly acquiescing in US tactics. Former US intelligence chief Dennis Blair has stated that the United States should stop its drone campaign in Pakistan. The CIA’s drone operation aimed at Al Qaeda was backfiring by damaging the US-Pakistan relationship. Even more important is the number of recruits it brings to the ranks of the militant organizations. Jeffrey Addicott, who served as the senior legal adviser to the US Army Special Forces, the Green Berets, asks: ‘Are we creating more enemies than we‘re killing or capturing by our activities? Unfortunately, I think the answer is yes. These families have 10 sons each. You kill one son and you create 9 more enemies. You‘re not winning over the population.‘ Hyperbole perhaps, but the danger is real enough: President Obama‘s key weapon in the war of terror is becoming increasingly an ‘own goal‘ for the United States.

Richard Bonney appears on the BBC's Life of the Prophet series

Brief appearances talking about jihad in the life of the Prophet in episodes 2 and 3

Richard Bonney talking about Warriors after War

Warriors after War is published by Peter Lang